NATO in Afghanistan

The Future of AFRICOM
Development Companies Help Reconstruct Civil Society in Afghanistan
China: The Rising Giant of UN Peacekeeping
Is Hope Returning to Timor-Leste?
We live in a world that gets smaller each day. Inescapably, there are clashes between cultures and values systems. Tragedies that went unnoticed and undetected decades ago are now daily brought to the world via network news and the Internet.

And now that we are aware of the many atrocities on this earth, those of us who enjoy security, peace and freedom are called to share that opportunity with the world.

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NATO in Afghanistan

Amb. H. G. Scheltema
6 ISAF and Governance in Southern Afghanistan

Najibullah Lafraye
7 A New Plan for Afghanistan: Five Solutions to Combat Insurgency

Michael Shank
8 The Importance of Development in Reducing Taliban Recruitment

Cameron Scott
9 NATO’s Achievements and Challenges in Afghanistan

Special Feature.
Private Sector Development in Afghanistan
Andrew Curtin
10 Agricultural Initiatives Help Rebuild Afghan Communities

Jessica Kruvant-Wilson
11 Supporting Literacy, Education and Civil Society in Afghanistan

Study of Peace Ops.
Ylana Gracielli and Tabita Duarte
17 The Advantages of Competitive Intelligence for the PSO Industry

Lawrence T. Peter
21 Iraq Heats Up as Summer Approaches

Global Attitudes.
Boshen Jia
24 China: The Rising Giant of United Nations Peacekeeping

Industry News.
IPOA Lion
5 News from IPOA

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Douglas Brooks

Observations on NATO and Afghanistan
And a Farewell to General Indar Jit Rikhye, a Founding Father of Peacekeeping

IPOA is happy to introduce a sharp new look for the Journal of International Peace Operations as we begin our third volume. The critical focus of the Journal will continue – short, insightful articles on the most significant issues related to international peace and stability operations and the critical role of the private sector. Editor-in-Chief, J. J. Messner, has continually improved and enhanced the Journal and it is the IPOA product that is most widely recognized and celebrated. It has truly become the pride of IPOA.

In this issue of the Journal we take a hard look at the NATO stability operation in Afghanistan. While less politically controversial than the operations in Iraq and with far greater international support, operations in Afghanistan can still be remarkably difficult and perhaps even more complex due to the multifarious nature. The mission is seen as a ‘must-win’ by many international analysts – for NATO and for the future of Afghanistan itself. This issue includes a variety of perspectives and insights.

It has been fascinating to make comparisons between typical UN operations and the issues that have surfaced in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. From my observations during my visit to Kabul in October 2006, and in many discussions with NATO personnel, it is clear there are significant tensions within the larger operation. Some of the tensions are similar to the ones experienced during UN operations, revolving around the distinct reluctance of Western states to deploy their forces into serious military operations. There are also many questions about the level of combat in which military units from different nations are allowed to participate, as with the UN the Rules of Engagement which vary between nations. Whatever the public statements, it is clear that a handful of NATO militaries are shouldearging the bulk of combat operations in support of Afghanistan’s security forces.

More NATO militaries are restricted by their governments to ‘softer side’ activities such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), but even those can be quite dangerous depending on their location. The PRTs also raise another issue in common with UN operations – the clear tension between the civilian NGOs and the militaries sharing the operation. When you throw in the private sector companies that are working for either the NGOs or the militaries, or even for other actors such as the Afghanistan government, then you have a remarkable peacekeeping goulash. In general, everyone is moving towards the same goals, but coordinating these elements – or at least ensuring they are not duplicating efforts or working at cross purposes – is an issue we may have to examine in future issues of the Journal.

AFRICOM is the Department of Defense’s new command for Africa and this is something IPOA sees as a very positive step forward. The U.S. policy towards African security over the past forty years has been described one of benign neglect, but hopefully AFRICOM will be able to improve that situation somewhat. While there have been a number of very successful programs aimed at enhancing African peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities such as ACOTA and Operation Focused Relief, AFRICOM can help unify efforts and coordinate long term policies. There have been more than 100 military coups in Africa since 1960, and it is clear that professionalizing militaries can do much to ensure an African state’s military is not the greatest threat to democracy. At the same time, African states have been increasingly proactive in tackling the continent’s many humanitarian security problems. Regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and later the African Union have shown admirable interest in taking the lead on African peace operations. Even UN operations on the continent are dominated by African peace keeping soldiers. Thus, the new American interest in ensuring more professionalism in Africa can help enhance Africa’s ability to solve its own problems.

It should also be noted that AFRICOM has been described as not ‘kinetic’ – meaning the Command is unlikely to have any deployable combat units. AFRICOM’s focus will be on training, support and advice, all of which can prove invaluable to the professionalization of African militaries, the enhancement of their peacekeeping capabilities, and the huge positive effects on long-term stability for the continent.

Finally, I want to note with sadness the death of General Indar Jit Rikhye. General Rikhye was a decorated military leader and one of the fathers of UN peacekeeping. As an Indian soldier he led some of the initial ‘Blue Helmet’ operations in the Middle East and the Congo when international peacekeeping was still being molded from a vague notion in the UN Charter. He was a thoughtful man who even in these early UN operations recognized that the performance of his units in the field could have long-term global implications to international peace operations. By amazing fortune I had the opportunity to meet this remarkable man on my way back from a JAG conference in Charlottesville, Virginia in December 2005. He happened to be sitting across the aisle on my Greyhound bus to Washington, DC. I was describing private sector peacekeeping support concepts to my seatmate and I was astonished when the spry 85 year old general introduced himself. General Rikhye was fascinated with the IPOA concept of private sector support for UN peace operations. The next day he came by to visit our offices and met with our young Research Associates. We had a number of long discussions and I learned that General Rikhye had a strong pragmatic streak. He too recognized that the private sector concept had a great deal of potential. We note the passing of this remarkable man with sadness.


PHOTO: DOUG BROOKS/IPOA

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Leadership and Staffing Changes at IPOA

Committees Hold Bimonthly Elections

IPOA has experienced a number of personnel changes to its Committee leadership and office staffing during recent months.

Professor John Stuart Blackton, Senior Strategic Advisor to the Creative Center for Security and Stabilization (C2S2) at Creative Associates International, Inc. has been elected to fill a vacancy on the IPOA Executive Committee. Professor Blackton, a past contributor to the Journal, has been a staunch and vocal supporter of IPOA, and his contributions to IPOA will be greatly appreciated. His election also marks the first occasion that a member company from the development sector has been represented on the Executive Committee.

IPOA’s other Committees have also held their bimonthly elections.

- Judith McCallum of Olive Group has been re-elected to a second term as Chair of the Standards Committee.
- Raymond Uren of Medical Support Solutions has been elected to Chair of the Membership Committee after Aric Mutchnick of ArmorGroup stepped down following two successful terms.
- Mike Griffin of Olive Group has been elected to Chair of the Government Affairs Committee.

IPOA also welcomes back former Associate Carrie Schenkel, who will assume the position of IPOA Events Coordinator.

IPOA da la bienvenida a su nuevo miembro español

IPOA Welcomes First Spanish Member

IPOA would like to welcome Ge2b as the newest member of our Association. Ge2b, based in the south of Spain, is an International Security Consulting and Risk Management Company serving corporate clients throughout the world. Though relatively young, Ge2b is establishing itself with a client base throughout eastern and western Europe, as well as in South America.

The addition of Ge2b brings IPOA’s total number of members to 35. As always, the addition of new member companies helps to increase IPOA’s influence, capability, and reach as an Association. We are better positioned now than ever before to meet our goals and follow our mission as an Association dedicated to the responsible, professional use of the private sector in peace, stability, and disaster relief operations.

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INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION MEMBER PROFILE

Track24

Sustainable Stand-Off Security

Track24 is a leading provider of tracking and crisis management solutions to organizations operating in hostile zones.

In recent years the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan – where Track24 supports over 50 clients, including security companies, NGOs and governments – has driven forward the use of information and communications technologies for the security of personnel and assets. The operational concepts developed there are now being applied in other high-risk environments around the world.

The foundation of Track24’s solution is its web-based C4i platform, the most scalable and operationally tested tracking and risk management application on the market. It gives clients a global common operating picture on a single screen, displaying people, vehicles, static locations such as villas, aircraft and maritime assets on digital mapping.

Track24 combine this strategic management and response tool with a range of satellite and GSM-based tracking devices suited to different assets and operational circumstances. Robust and reliable, they have been tested in the world’s most demanding post-conflict environments. The integrated software-hardware solution enables security companies to provide a monitoring and response capability as a service. It offers NGOs, as part of their investment in the mitigation of risk, a security solution without the visible presence and cost of close protection. If an incident occurs they will know within seconds who is in trouble and exactly where they are, allowing an appropriate response to be arranged. This is called SSOS – Sustainable Stand-Off Security.

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Tthe relationship between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of Afghanistan has always been a multi-faceted one. This was certainly the case in the South of the country, when I stayed there as a political advisor to the commander of the Regional Command South (RC(S)), Major-General van Loon, during the Dutch ‘leden-nation’ period (November 2006-April 2007).

Although the ISAF mandate, in South Afghanistan as much as elsewhere in the country, defines its subordinate role in relationship to the Afghan Government, the security situation in many respects turned the commander of RC(S) into ‘the biggest local warlord’, as van Loon himself often jokingly put it. That reality implied an ambivalent relationship with local Governance, which it effectively overshadowed in some respects. It determined to a large extent the scope of action of the ISAF activities in the period mentioned above.

Two key examples will serve to illustrate this role of ISAF in relation to Governance. They both underline the broad character of the ISAF activities in the South, encompassing Defence, Diplomacy and Development (the 3 D’s) aspects, as defined in ISAF’s actual policy.

Whereas ISAF is also established at a regional command level - as well as provincial- this is not mirrored by a similar regional level of Governance: provinces are indeed directly subordinated to the central authorities in Kabul. The President, the central Government, ministries as well as the Policy Action Group, all supervise, control and direct activities at a Provincial level. As in many countries elsewhere, relations between the capital and the provinces are centralistic, top-down, and reflect a strong dependency, both in personal and financial terms, of the Governors. They are appointed and dismissed by Presidential decrees, whereas Provincial ‘ministries’ (in fact technical departments at Provincial level) are dependent on their respective line-ministries in the capital. Chiefs of police are appointed by the central Government and are, at least formally, only partly subjected to the authority of their respective Governors.

Most telling, the funds which the Governors had at their own disposal have been greatly reduced in 2006 with the withdrawal of the so-called ‘discretionary’ or ‘operational’ funds. Their rapid exhaustion in spending led to a decision of the Minister of Finance to halt the allocation, at least for the remainder of the fiscal year 2006, until matters were sorted out. Whatever the merits of this decision, it was yet another demonstration of a lack of delegated authority at provincial level. The effectiveness of Governors, in fact, often depended on their individual relationship with Kabul. Regional coordination or structured dialogue among the Provinces themselves did not exist, nor did the central Government invest enough resources in reaching out to the population in the troubled provinces in the South. This was all the more regrettable as most of the issues of e.g. security, corruption, narcotics, development and capacity building were (and are) similar if not identical.

However, in early 2007 ISAF RC(S) started to bring together, for the first time, three out of four Governors of the Provinces in which it had a military presence. This brain-storming session was largely a ‘dry-run’ for a more ambitious regular conference among the southern Governors and was successfully repeated in April at the office of the Governor of Kandahar, Asadullah Khalid. The second gathering had a larger and more structured scope. This time, the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was also invited to help and prepare the meeting. Thanks to UNAMA, the Governors of the more isolated provinces of Nimroz and Day Kundi could be brought to the meeting. Furthermore, representatives of the Central Government, alongside with the National Security adviser, Dr Zalmay Rasoul, also joined. It also allowed for visibility of UNAMA in this field, which had been lacking in the South. Thus, the meeting allowed for a structured as well as an informal discussion between the Central and Provincial levels as well as the international community on matters of mutual concern.

Military operations, of any nature, are much more successful if embedded within a broader strategy of long-term security, advancing hand in hand with development and good-Governance. This seemingly self-evident remark is, in reality, has not always been fully taken into account when preparing and executing a military operations. To maximize the effect of operations, commanders should properly assess and take into account the effects on the population, the interaction with the civilians and the necessary ‘after-care’. That is the essence of ‘winning the hearts and minds’.

At the end of the summer of 2006, ISAF had been conducting a major operation West of Kandahar, in the Panjwayi/Zaray districts. The initial aim was to rid the area from an increasing and menacing Taliban presence, which had started to threaten the city itself. Although militarily successful, the operation got somewhat stuck in November by a stalemate between the ISAF troops and the remaining opposing forces. It needed to be concluded by measures which would allow the population to return to their villages and development aid to get started. An intensified and focused dialogue with the local elders was called for, irrespective of their views on the Government or inter-tribal disputes. They were to be convinced to support the follow-up military activities, with prospects of subsequent material assistance, jobs for their sons as ‘auxiliary police’ and overall stability. The foreseen presence of President Karzai in December in Kandahar provided a timely platform for this dialogue to hopefully lead to the necessary civilian support. The Governor of Kandahar was persuaded of the necessity of this approach. The local elders were brought together for an inclusive and prolonged process and were convinced, by and large, of the planning of the operation. BaaZ Tsuka, as the operation was called, carefully aimed at minimizing the kinetic dimension and collateral damage and allowed, after securing the area, the return of thousands of locals as well as starting reconstruction. Although other elements played a role, the explicit outreach to the local elders and ‘key leaders’ undoubtedly contributed to the success of the operation and to a noticeable change in the security climate.

The examples above aim to demonstrate the importance of ISAF’s role in Governance, which had become inevitable because of the absence of the international community (and especially the UN) in this field. ISAF has had to fill the gap left by other more obvious international actors, here as much as in the (majority of the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams. This has repeatedly forced a military organization, with only relatively few civilian advisers, to address issues outside its core business, a situation which should and can be redressed, gradually but surely.
WHILE discussing the U.S. options in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 2001, the general rule for American policy makers was to study what the Soviets had done and do the opposite. With patience and ingenuity they could have found ways of removing the Talib an from power and disrupting the al Qaeda terrorist network without military involvement. That would have been the real lesson learned. Instead, the Americans decided to wage the war differently, relying on Afghan militias, a small number of Special Forces and massive use of airpower. Once the military option was adopted, however, there was no way but to follow the Soviet path in committing increasingly more troops.

In the initial stages, leading to the overthrow of the Talib an, less than 450 Special Forces personnel and CIA officers took part. Soon, the U.S. and its allies sent ground troops to pursue the al Qaeda leadership. Operation Anaconda, began in March 2002, involved about 2,000 American troops, but they still relied on several thousand Afghan militias. Failure of that operation, together with the unreliability of Afghan militias earlier in Tora Bora, forced the Allies to increase the number of their troops to over 10,000 by early 2003 and to over 20,000 by October 2004. At the same time, the size of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) increased from 4,500 in 2002 to 8,500 in mid 2004. Those numbers changed little for more than a year. By the end of 2005, the successful conclusion of Afghan elections and a lull in the insurgency encouraged the U.S. to plan a partial withdrawal of troops and transfer more responsibility to NATO.

NATO assumed the command and control of ISAF in August 2003 and slowly started moving out of Kabul to the areas lacking international forces, first to the north and then to the west. In July 2006, NATO also moved to the restive south and took over the command there from the Allied Forces. The planned reduction of the U.S. troops, however, did not occur due to a surprising resurgence of the Talib an insurgency in spring and summer of 2006. On the contrary, NATO had to double the number of its troops from 9,000 to 18,000. In October 2006, more than half of the American troops in the east were also put under NATO’s command, and thus NATO assumed responsibility for military operations all over Afghanistan.

The trend of committing more troops to Afghanistan has continued in 2007. At the beginning of June this year, the number of NATO and U.S. troops stands at about 50,000. Yet, the NATO leadership is dissatisfied and has called for more robust forces. This approach is inherently flawed. The American and NATO forces are no longer part of the solution in Afghanistan, but part of the problem — exactly the same way that the Red Army was.

American troops were welcomed as liberators after the defeat of the Talib an, but they have overstayed their welcome. With countless mistakes, they have managed to turn much of the population against them. NATO was well aware of this, and its commanders spoke of adopting a new strategy. But they too seem to be committing similar mistakes. Additionally, for many Afghans, there is no difference between an American soldier and a Canadian or Dutch soldier. They are all part of the “infidel” army trying to occupy their country. If the international community wants to deny the Talib an an important recruiting tool, it must withdraw all Western troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible.

This suggestion may seem irresponsible. Without the military support of the international community, the Karzai government is unlikely to survive more than a few months, leading to chaos and a greater disaster. That will not happen, however, if the withdrawal forms part of a comprehensive plan for solving the Afghan problem. The following elements can constitute the basis of such a plan:

1. Formation of a Muslim international peacekeeping force under UN command. Undoubtedly, Afghanistan needs the international community’s military support in the short run. To provide such support without exacerbating local resentment, a new UN-led peacekeeping force of Muslim soldiers is needed. They could come from countries with no direct involvement in current events in Afghanistan — e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco and Tunisia. The mission should be financed by the countries currently deploying troops in Afghanistan. It might not persuade the Talib an to support the peace process but would certainly dissuade many young Afghans from joining the insurgency.

2. A new focus on training Afghan army and police. Even Muslim peacekeepers will run into trouble if they stay more than a couple of years. Thus, Afghan army and police must be enabled to take charge of security as soon as possible.

3. A new intra-Afghan dialogue. Karzai may be the best possible leader under the present conditions and the 2004 constitution may be one of the best in the region, but a broader, more legitimate process is now required. It should include all the prominent personalities from within and outside the country. No time limit should be

set and no restrictions imposed on free expression of grievances and views. It might take many months, but only through such a process can a new social contract emerge.

4. A new focus on human development. Billions of dollars have poured into Afghanistan in the past five years. Most people, however, have seen little positive change in their lives. On the contrary, they’ve seen growing inequality and rampant corruption. The reconstruction strategy must take aid directly to local communities and let the people decide how it is used. The rich Muslim nations should help to boost the amount of aid.

5. Curtailing interference by neighbors. The fact that the Talib an enjoy widespread support in Pakistan is in little doubt any more. The international community needs to find ways of curbing the assistance given the insurgency from across the border.

A New Plan for Afghanistan

Five Solutions to Curtail Insurgents
Reducing Taliban Recruitment by Development

Self-Government is the Way to Win Hearts and Minds

UNITED States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ recent commentary that “things are slowly, cautiously headed in the right direction” in Afghanistan convinced very few. General Dan McNeill, commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, seconded the notion by saying “I would judge that we presently have the upper hand in what we’re doing.” There would be much to celebrate if that were true.

Instead, Kabul is displeased with what appears to be a strategy of shoot and spray—the former aimed at suspected Taliban, the latter at farmers’ opium fields. So fed up in fact, are Afghanistan’s higher and lower parliamentary houses, that they have called on timelines for foreign troop withdrawal culminating in the eventual eviction of international forces. Realizing that local support for foreign intervention was waning fast, Gates coupled his “right direction” comment with a spurious claim that Iran was arming Afghanis (despite a lack of evidence)—an attempt, it seems, to justify a longer U.S.-NATO stay in the country. No one seems to be buying into this idea.

If the U.S., or NATO for that matter, wants Afghanistan to head in the “right direction”, it must rethink its shoot and spray policy—an approach which is leaving, respectively, hundreds of innocent civilians dead and desperate farmers in its wake. NATO, to its credit, seems to understand the need to rethink strategy. General McNeill recently admitted the “lack of unified effort among the international community in terms of the reconstruction effort” and recommended that aid donors coordinate with the Afghan government and give Afghanis more control over projects. While General McNeill understands in theory what needs correcting, in practice he appears ill-equipped. The fix, in McNeill terms, is feasible only with improved equipment, i.e. maneuver forces, battalions, and attack helicopters. All receipts point to further attacks; a reconstruction plan is simply not on his immediate agenda.

So if not shoot and spray, then what? Short of killing people and destroying crops, the Afghan and Dutch governments are pursuing more promising routes that are worth considering. The Afghan government aims to negotiate with the Taliban, asking NATO to do the same. The Dutch, alternatively, in the words of Commander Colonel Hans van Griensven, are “not here to fight the Taliban,” but rather “here to make the Taliban irrelevant”. While dialogue with the Taliban is undoubtedly a non-starter for the U.S. or NATO, strategy employed by the Dutch offers the best chance for success by foreign troops. If the U.S. and NATO adopted the Dutch approach—i.e. building and repairing schools, mosques, police garrisons, courtrooms and hospitals, offering job training, assistance in self-governance—then perhaps foreign troops might wield the “upper hand” in Afghanistan. Yet Dutch influence is limited with only 2,000 troops in the country. Imagine if the remaining 32,000 NATO troops and the U.S.’s 16,000 troops adhered to the Dutch attitude of respect and restraint: a different Afghanistan would emerge.

Why? This change would undermine the Taliban’s political and economic appeal. Currently the Taliban offers the disaffected and impoverished an appealing package: a voice, albeit unofficial, in the national political arena and an enviable salary often six times that of government pay. The Dutch recognize this and thus attempt to provide an alternate, equally competitive package.

The remaining U.S. and NATO troops, inadvertently stimulate a fresh batch of recruits for the Taliban with their indiscriminate shelling and opium eradication. Villagers in Afghanistan’s western town of Shindand—the latest victim of a U.S. bombardment that destroyed 100 homes and killed 57 people, half of which were women and children—are now ripe for the Taliban picking. Farmers whose crops lie in ruins, and who were provided no viable agricultural alternative by the very U.S. forces responsible for the spraying, also remain vulnerable to Taliban recruitment. Ironically, it is as if the U.S. and NATO forces were working on behalf of the Taliban. The offensive orchestrated by Gates and McNeill is only boosting Taliban morale. Consequently, the right direction in Afghanistan is not more shooting and spraying. The U.S. has employed tactics like this for several years now and the Taliban has only benefited, fueled by the anger and bitterness of victims’ families and bankrupt farmers. The proper direction in Afghanistan is to make the Taliban irrelevant, as the Dutch are doing. That means improving the lives of Afghanis and their ability to self-govern. Until that happens, however, expect higher numbers of fresh Taliban recruits.
THE international community has played a central role in bringing change to Afghanistan since 2001, and the participation of NATO in leading the U.N. authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been invaluable. ISAF was conceived as a peacekeeping mission at the Bonn Agreement in 2001, and since coming under NATO leadership in 2003 it has expanded to cover all of Afghanistan with over 35,000 personnel from 37 nations, including non-NATO members such as Australia and Sweden. ISAF has played a prominent role in developing the Afghan security forces and also runs 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Afghanistan, where civilian and military personnel help coordinate humanitarian and development projects.

However, Afghanistan’s considerable progress is challenged by numerous problems, and while many areas are relatively stable, others remain insecure. The causes of this insecurity are complicated and rooted in issues related to poor governance, lack of economic development, and a burgeoning narcotics trade. A resurgent Taliban, along with other groups including warlords and drug-traffickers, are exploiting this situation in an attempt to destabilize the central government. Despite sustaining significant casualties and losing key leaders, the Taliban retain an ability to wage asymmetric warfare by inflicting losses on the security forces and intimidating the civilian population. Their strategy is simply to outlast the international forces, whom they feel have a limited commitment to Afghanistan.

Over 4,000 Afghans were killed during 2006, and in response to the rising levels of violence, NATO’s role has evolved to one which is at times more war-fighting than peacekeeping. This fighting has been described by NATO leaders as counter-insurgency, with the population forming the ‘center of gravity’ whose support must be won in order for the rule of the central government to be assured. Counter-insurgency operations are complex, requiring a broad range of effort in which military objectives must be coordinated with political, economic and social goals to form a comprehensive strategy. The challenge in Afghanistan is increased by the diverse range of actors involved in the reconstruction effort, which includes various foreign governments, NGOs and private agencies, who do not necessarily coordinate their efforts and may have overlapping or incompatible aims.

NATO’s role in Afghanistan is critical, but its ability to influence the situation is limited. As a military alliance, it has neither the expertise nor mandate to tackle such problems as corruption or counter-narcotics, and must focus its efforts on security provision. NATO brings to Afghanistan an exceptional wealth of experience and resources for this task, yet it remains critically short of a resource that is vital for successful counter-insurgency operations: personnel. Last autumn, NATO officials estimated there was roughly a 10 percent shortfall in troops and equipment, and despite repeated requests from political leaders for reinforcements, only marginal increases have been forthcoming. ISAF also lacks ‘force multipliers’ such as transport helicopters, which are essential in a country where road transportation networks are limited. Without these resources it is difficult to employ the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy that is central to establishing confidence amongst the civilian population and providing tangible improvement in their lives.

Surveys conducted last year showed that the chief concern of Afghan people was the declining security situation, and while many remained supportive of the government and optimistic about the direction of their country, confidence in both had dropped significantly since 2005. The Taliban and other anti-government forces have an advantage of time that international forces do not. NATO must act quickly to establish conditions under which efforts to establish better governance and implement programs that benefit ordinary Afghans can proceed, which will in turn build support for the government and weaken the Taliban.

The restoration of the hydro-electric Kajaki dam in Helmand province is an example of a high-impact project that will raise living standards by creating jobs and economic opportunity while providing clear evidence of government success that boosts public confidence. Information operations should in turn be designed to undermine the credibility of the Taliban by highlighting their brutality and disregard for human life. Development and training of the Afghan army and police must be accelerated and properly funded, for these forces will eventually assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security. Their lack of pay and sub-standard equipment is a particular problem, one which NATO members can help address through further subsidization.

NATO must also uphold its promise to avoid civilian casualties, which alienate the population from the government and international forces.

The international commitment in Afghanistan must be reconsidered and its shortcomings addressed. Insufficient pledges and delivery of financial aid, an incoherent counter-narcotics program and a failure to resolve the border dispute with Pakistan are just some of the problems which help foster insecurity and will continue to jeopardize the entire endeavor if they are not dealt with as part of a comprehensive strategy. NATO must work in close partnership with the larger international community and the Afghan government to develop this strategy and redouble its efforts to provide a security situation that enables it to succeed.

ENDNOTES


More information on the Afghanistan Action Program is available at: www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AG-survey06.pdf
Private Security Companies in Afghanistan

Working Hand-in-Hand with NATO and the Afghan Government

“MAYDAY…Mayday…Hotel 19 has red engine lights and is making an emergency landing”. This recent call for help was not from a military helicopter suffering engine failure undergoing a forced landing in Helmand province, but a helicopter exclusively leased by a large reconstruction company operating on a major US government contract. What happened next demonstrates how the private sector and NATO are operating in concert in southern Afghanistan.

The radio call was received in the private company’s Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which is manned 24/7 and well tied in to the NATO Joint Command Center (JCC) in Kabul. The JCC was able to contact the nearest local unit, which moved forces - in this case, British military forces - to the area. While the helicopter was on the ground it was attacked by anti-government elements using rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms. On board were 2 personnel working for the reconstruction company, two armed security personnel and the pilot, all of whom had to move away from the helicopter and for the next 3 hours avoid capture until the rescue force could arrive and secure the area. To ensure the military was aware of this friendly movement, numerous calls occurred between the personnel on the ground and the TOC using their satellite phone and then from the TOC to both the JCC and to their own liaison officer attached to the forces tasked with the rescue. This was truly the best example of how it should work.

The use of liaison officers is another example of how private companies are integrating with NATO. This was once strictly a military method used to ensure multinational units or units from different countries on each other’s flanks understood each other’s actions and movements. Now in the NATO command structure which was almost immediately interested in this option.

This system of private companies running their own TOCs and the use of liaison officers are unique to Afghanistan and vastly different from Iraq. In Iraq, the U.S. military established the Regional Operations Center’s (ROC) staffed by both military and private security personnel to coordinate all private sector movements. All companies register with the nearest ROC and prior to any movement, contact the ROC to ensure they are being monitored electronically. Should an incident occur, it is the ROC staff that contact the U.S. military quick reaction force to respond. Often this system works well, but private companies also complain loudly about the lag time between electronically signaling a major incident and the response, which often results in kidnappings and larger death tolls than necessary.

Another element for private companies working in Afghanistan to consider, relates to the increase in Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police activity in providing protection and response. This has brought with it challenges of it’s own, depending on where the company intends to work. There is also the issue of using Interior Ministry troops, which are a quasi National police, as they are often recruited from their home provinces and do not work well with those from other provinces. Problems include major fire fights between units. Private companies have taken up this challenge by hiring Afghan advisors who have a better understanding of the subtleties of the various tribes and regions. They have also paid the Army and police directly to provide liaison officers to be available at the various worksites to ensure both understand what the private companies are doing. These liaison officers are also of great benefit when movements are being conducted, in that they can help with passage through checkpoints and can also help with identifying fake checkpoints.

Private companies are also discovering the challenges of working with the new Afghan government, which is slowly moving towards a truer form of democracy and a less corrupt, free market economy. The current key to success is to hire the right local national that can assist with challenges such as customs clearance, business licenses, and those everyday challenges involving the various ministries that have to approve business activities. Recently the government ordered all private security companies to notify the police prior to conducting a movement within Kabul. Any private security company caught making an unapproved movement would have their weapons and vehicles confiscated, and their personnel would have their visa’s revoked. If a company had a second offence they would have their business license and weapon’s permit suspended for a period of time, while a third offence would see the company fully decertified. One can argue providing local nationals with your movement details is a bad option or see it as a sign of progress, as the Afghan government begins to take control of its country. Either way it is a dramatic change in the way private security companies are doing business in Afghanistan; only time will tell whether or not the police are ready for the responsibility of protecting important information.

Based on both my past personal experiences, and those of my fellow contractors continuing to work in Afghanistan, it would appear that the majority of the country will continue down the right path. Life for private companies should become more predictable, however I still see storm clouds for those provinces bordering Pakistan particularly Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Pakthka and Khost. While continuing to operate in these provinces, NATO, the Afghan government, the private sector must do so with a much higher threshold for rapid results, and much lower level of risk. Private companies need to be prepared to take on these operations centers and budget for liaison officers to ensure they are fully integrated into both the Afghan security forces and NATO. The risk being caught unaware of activities of anti-government forces in their area of operations or an unnecessarily slow response.

This summer and fall will be a timeframe to pay attention to as military operations, reconstruction activity and anti-poppy activity will be ramped up to the highest level yet. Specifically in southern provinces, as the Afghan government and NATO are feeling confident enough in the remainder of the country to finally focus on the most turbulent Afghan regions. If by next spring we are still seeing the current levels of violence in all of these provinces private companies will most likely be reevaluating their business plans.

Afghanistan it is increasingly becoming both a military and civilian position with many contracts calling for security companies to be capable of conducting direct liaison with the Kabul-based headquarters and with the field units located throughout the country. It has taken a great deal of time and patience to get to the point where the military is willing to work this closely with the civilian sector but it really picked up steam with the arrival of

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CURRENT thoughts about post-conflict reconstruction are based on the idea that a successful campaign can be achieved by undertaking a comprehensive approach to security. Security is seen as the lynchpin by which all other endeavors can then be predicated. However, the challenges of stabilizing contemporary Afghanistan have been compounded by a strategy that fails to approach the establishment of security in a holistic fashion. NATO has declared that Afghanistan is its highest priority, especially as it is the Alliance’s “first mission outside the European Atlantic area” and yet the security approach taken thus far has resulted in a fractured outcome.

Even the basic concept of security presents a myriad of considerations. Establishing security involves ceasing warfare, providing law enforcement, instituting a robust judicial system and managing jails among many other tasks—activities which to date have not been well coordinated. In 2002, five countries (United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and Japan) took on roles as “lead donors.” However current levels of progress have come under sharp criticism. Critics within Germany, whose government is working to build a national Afghan police force, have charged that Afghan police are badly trained in part due to German police themselves being inadequately prepared for such a mission. The five-country approach has meant a lack of leadership, and a dearth of co-ordination on elements that are very much related to each other, such as policing, judicial reform, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, and drug interdiction. Police trainers and managers lack clear lines of contact, resulting in confusion and frustration. A renewed approach to policing must include more cohesion and coordination among the active parties involved.

In late 2006, the U.S. government described the capabilities of Afghanistan’s police as “far from adequate.” Police are reportedly paid about $70 a month, about a fifth what the Taliban and insurgent elements offer. This increases their propensity to be attracted by bribery and corruption. The complicity of some police officers in drug trafficking and illegal acts has also detracted from the overall security situation. Furthermore, many recruits lack uniforms, are illiterate and have no previous policing experience.

Experience has shown that effective law enforcement comprises an important part of transitions. After war subsides, a reconstruction strategy which prioritizes a transition to law and order is key. Reinstituting a sense of normalcy must incorporate capturing the hearts and minds of the local populace so that people feel safe to resume their lives and feel a sense of security. Military capabilities cannot substitute for policing ones. However, there is currently a lack of adequate international policing capacity, a condition which has led to adopting the sub-optimal strategy of using military personnel where law enforcement officers would be better suited. Filling the security gap with police can better address the problem and result in a better outcome. Future peace operations should be predicated on the idea that law enforcement and military operations are two sides of the same coin. The baseline requirements for security considerations have a formulaic nature. In a RAND study entitled Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, international troop levels should be at least 1,000 soldiers per 100,000 inhabitants and international police levels should be at least 150 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, especially when there is the potential for severe instability. After five years, the level of domestic polices should be at least 200 polices per 100,000 inhabitants.1

Despite the consensus in the peace and stability operations field that effective security forms the cornerstone for proper post-conflict reconstruction, this notion is only effective if it is pursued comprehensively. The “golden hour” concept reinforces the idea that the period initially following the cessation of hostilities is the optimal time to institute basic security, prevent a backslide of violence, and create goodwill among the local populace. In addition to more coordination among nations and international organizations, a more robust contribution to progress can be made by soliciting increased participation from the peace and stability operations industry. Trainers from the private sector include highly experienced professionals, including recently retired police officers many of whom (about half) also possess previous military experience. Tasks undertaken include police mentoring, basic law enforcement training and literacy support. In a transitional environment such expertise can make a positive impact only if deployed in a strong enough magnitude and given a long enough mandate. In the long run, such an approach will likely lead to a higher rate of overall success and greater cost-effectiveness.

The Secretary-General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has said “Security cannot be achieved by military means alone. Institution-building, development, reconstruction and human-capacity building mutually reinforces the security efforts.” Adopting a piecemeal approach to security has shown to be an obstacle to establishing a comprehensive and sustainable foundation upon which all other facets of post-conflict reconstruction rely. Policing requires a longer-term approach predicated on long-term training and benchmarks. It necessitates a long-term commitment, which requires political will, funding, and the explicit recognition that long-term stability results from sufficient training and latent low-profile law enforcement. Policing the local streets may not be as glamorous as flexing military muscles, but in war to peace transitions, it is equally required to get the job done properly.

ENDNOTE


The Military’s Poor Cousin: Policing in Afghanistan

Focusing on Policing to Enhance the Base of Stability
A s a necessary adjunct to its policies to combat terrorism, the United States has returned to the nation-building business, and is now spending billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to alter the conditions that lead to regional instability and terrorism. Historically, the provision of foreign aid in the aftermath of a conflict is a recurring pattern in U.S. foreign policy. At the end of World War II, for example, the U.S. instituted the Marshall Plan to rebuild a shattered Europe and make it unthinkable for Germany to ever again pose a threat to its Western neighbors. Currently, the U.S. is attempting a similar strategy of nation-building in Afghanistan, with a similar goal: to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a breeding ground for violent extremism.

However, the situation in Afghanistan in 2007 is very different to that of Europe in 1945. The enemy has not been defeated and the majority of aid and reconstruction is being carried out by a professionalized U.S. military. Specifically, military-operated Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) being given broad resources and authority to conduct nation-building and development work in Afghanistan. This is a change in foreign policy that has been little-remarked upon, and yet is a significant development. It raises several ethical issues - what will the effect be on NGOs of the provision of development assistance by U.S. military forces, and how will placing the U.S. military in charge of this mission affect the quality and type of the aid delivered?

The U.S. military is being asked to administer the entire reconstruction process, rather than just the immediate security duties. Traditionally, the military has been tasked with fighting and winning America’s wars. In the post-Vietnam era in particular, the U.S. military has been trained to maximize speed and to withdraw as soon as the enemy has been defeated. While this strategy yields decisive battlefield victories, it has also created a culture of impatience. This attitude tends to make the military more interested in quick, concrete results rather than the long-term intangibles which are, crucial towards sustainable development. In addition, it creates the perception that the U.S. is only interested in quick solutions and will not “stay the course.” Requiring the military to provide security, fight an active insurgency, and concurrently administer a development program increases the likelihood of otherwise valuable aid being hijacked by violence. It must be remembered that the U.S. military which implemented the Marshall Plan back in 1945, was vastly larger and had the entire American society harnessed to the reconstruction effort.

The effect of PRT engagement in Afghanistan is a very important issue for NGOs, given that their worst fear is the provision of similar services offered by PRTs will confuse Afghans as to the neutrality of NGO workers, and create an unsafe environment for their workers. This did not become the problem that many assumed it would, due to division of labor between PRTs and NGOs, and the fact that in many cases increased violence has made neutral humanitarian space a moot point. Nevertheless, to the degree that PRTs dress, talk and act like NGOs, they run the risk of endangering humanitarian aid workers, such as in the Zabul region of Afghanistan. Another possible danger that PRTs pose to NGOs is in funding. While PRTs contract many of their projects to NGOs, and because NGOs of the provision of similar services offered by PRTs is in funding. While PRTs contract many of their projects to NGOs, and because NGOs, given that their worst fear is the provision of similar services offered by PRTs.

The goal of U.S. foreign aid, regardless of the vehicle of its delivery, should be to support U.S. policy goals by providing immediate security and relief for target countries, while at the same time maximizing the long-term growth toward prosperous and democratic societies. With the militarization of U.S. foreign assistance represented by the current application of the PRT concept, both the long- and short-term goals of assistance are jeopardized. The United States government has the potential to provide coordination for NGOs and long-term solutions to failed states like Afghanistan. By delegating the task to the military, the U.S. government instead misuses its scarce security resources, alienates the NGOs who would otherwise be valuable partners, and shows the world that that Americans are only interested in quick fixes that come from the barrel of a rifle. Ethically, the U.S. bears the responsibility of doing better—in this case funding and staffing the civilian arms of foreign policy, to the necessary degree.
The Benefits of the Military in Humanitarian Roles

Provincial Reconstruction Teams Bring a New Dimension to the Role of the Military

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, are administrative units of international aid to Afghanistan and Iraq. They were born out of the military civil-affairs units, and were first known as Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). Civil affairs units, unlike regular military units, are designed and trained to be able to perform civil-governance and public service functions. PRTs are the result of previous experiences with civil-military missions in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in various locations since World War II. PRTs typically consist of reserve citizen-soldiers, with specific specialized skill sets, relating to their civilian occupations. Hence PRTs contain a very broad range of skills, which can be used in rebuilding Afghanistan.

There are currently 28 PRTs in Afghanistan. Each PRT is unique in the way it is assembled, in the way it addresses the current situations as they operate in regions with unique circumstances. Where, for example the PRT of Tarin Kowt, could have their main focused on the security aspect of governance, security and reconstruction, (because the volatile region demands such an emphasis) the PRT of Faizabad can focus on reconstruction and governance and will have a different composition of staff with specializations needed for that relatively calm situation. The strength of PRTs and ultimately their chances of success lie in the PRTs abilities to be flexible in their setup. Changing conditions ask for niche capabilities. If, for example a region falls back into heightened threat of insurgency, the PRT will change its setup accordingly, and once that threat has subsided, the PRT will change its nature to fit the new situation.

Some PRTs are now under NATO command, with different Allied countries commanding them and donating troops/staff to them. Some PRTs cooperate with other countries, such as is the current example of the Tarin Kowt PRT, which is under Dutch command with the Australian assistance. The nature of NATO, in that it consists of different countries providing different equipment which often is not interoperable, can cause problems. Maj. Gen. Van Loo, speaking at an Atlantic Council event recently, used the example of the four Chinook helicopters at Kandahar that were available to him. One was from The Netherlands, one from Australia and two from the U.S. The seemingly same helicopters were in fact completely different. Repair of one country’s helicopter by another country’s repair team was impossible, and thus the helicopter had to first be sent back to the country of origin and from there returned to Boeing for repair. On the other hand the multi-national nature of NATO offers a wide range of niche capabilities. Maj. Gen. Van Loo argued at this same event, that PRTs should facilitate and increase use of this feature and should facilitate this. To illustrate that this is already occurring he also noted that PRTs don not stick to the region they are assigned to, but are willing and often assist other PRTs in their missions as well.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have criticized the concept of PRTs. They are seen as a shift of the military into their realm. It is often noted that PRTs duplicate the efforts of NGOs. There is the possibility of PRTs eclipsing the achievements of NGOs in winning the hearts and minds of the people, as a result of blurring the lines between aid and military. There is a fear that those in need of aid will not look to NGOs as impartial, but as military units and thus effectively politicizing the aid.

Supporters of the PRT concept when refuting these criticisms, point out that although there is a possibility of abusing the PRTs as a political tool by governments, in Afghanistan such an abuse would be picked up by the media. The backlash on the government aiming to politicize aid would be great. PRTs are commanded by democratic countries with no interest in abusing their position. On the point of eclipsing previous achievements such as winning the trust of the people and not being viewed as the enemy, challengers of such a position argue that extremists will not respect neutrality of aid workers anyway. From past actions of insurgents, a lack of appreciation of the neutrality of such NGOs is evident. Where duplication of efforts occur, the aid effectively administered would be greater than in a situation where NGOs were the only source of such aid which is also noted as being beneficial.

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Ambassador H. G. Scheltema, former Political Advisor to ISAF and Major-General Ton van Loo, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of NATO, inspect operations in Afghanistan. PHOTO: NATO/ISAF

A Canadian PRT distributes supplies in Kandahar. PHOTO: SGT ROXANNE CLOWE/CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
Bringing Women in from the Cold

After Years of Marginalization and Repression, Women Become the Focus of Change

The Taliban was ousted from power, the Bonn Agreement was signed, a new Constitution has enshrined the rights of women, a democratically elected government is in power, women are serving in the Parliament, millions of girls are going to school. Despite progress for women in Afghanistan in recent years – it is not a linear, incremental progress. The social, economic and political rights of women in Afghanistan are still some of the least recognized in the world.

Afghan women continue to face significant obstacles to their active participation in society at all levels. Women face particular struggles in Afghanistan due to systematic denial of their rights. Lack of consideration, lack of inclusion and lack of collaboration with Afghan women within the existing and developing so-called democratic structures of national governance is prevalent.

Unfortunately, the same can be said of many of the intervening bodies that make up the international presence in Afghanistan – including NATO. The people of Afghanistan know very little about NATO’s mandate in their country. Seldom do people differentiate between NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, which is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the United States’ Operation Enduring Freedom. Whereas the primary mission of U.S. forces is counter-terrorism, ISAF’s primary role is to support the Government of Afghanistan in providing and maintaining security in order to enable reconstruction and development.

In practice, this takes the form of conducting patrols, embedding advisors within Afghan National Army units, and overseeing the operation of 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) located throughout Afghanistan. Described as “the leading edge” of NATO efforts in Afghanistan, PRTs combine civilian and military personnel to coordinate security and reconstruction efforts for the surrounding area.

“NATO can do a lot to bring peace, rehabilitation and reconstruction if they ensure the people’s participation in their overall program,” as one women’s rights activist aptly remarked. Afghan women represent at least one half of the population of Afghanistan. They want to be informed of what NATO is doing for the security of the Afghan people, particularly Afghan women. They demand a voice in security, development and reconstruction.

Development is only sustainable with security. And yet the inverse is also true. How can you have security when 90 percent of the population does not have access to basic needs, such as health care, clean water and educational opportunities? Providing both development and security when successes of one require successes of the other are precarious terms of engagement. To be sure, neither can be achieved without working with the people. In addition to having NATO working for Afghan women’s rights, Afghan women want to work with NATO for women’s rights, peace and security in Afghanistan. This includes a demand that all security operations have a female dimension. They want to be collaborators, not only beneficiaries.

Although the priorities of Afghan people and NATO – security, reconstruction and development – seem to be one and the same, the Afghan people still feel neither informed about, nor satisfied with what NATO is doing in Afghanistan. “NATO has not fulfilled our expectations regarding reconstruction, rehabilitation and restoration of peace and security,” I was told by a group of Afghan women. Afghan women’s expectations, needs and priorities were very clearly outlined to me by a group of Afghan women activists: reconstruction, rehabilitation and ensuring peace and security so that Afghan women can play a role in development of their families and society. Some of their expectations regarding reconstruction, rehabilitation and ensuring peace and security so that Afghan women can play a role in development of their families and society.

NATO should develop strategies and conduct operations with the support and collaboration with Afghan men and women. They should know Afghan women and men’s expectations, needs and priorities, which frequently differ.

The Secretary-General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said recently that reconstruction and development, and not a military solution, are the keys to durable peace in Afghanistan. The Afghan women I consulted have no problem with military engagement as part of multi-tiered (diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian) campaign for peace, as long as the Afghan National Army, and not the international military presence, facilitates a military solution.

Along with envisaging NATO’s continued humanitarian assistance, Afghan women want the international military presence in Afghanistan to refocus their energy and resources away from military engagement toward more assistance strengthening the Afghan National Army to work towards an internal military solution. It takes up to 50 years to build an army. Afghanistan is building its fourth army in 200 years. This is testament to the urgency of the international community to not waste time or withhold any resources necessary to build a professional Afghan National Army. The key to peace and democracy is not an active international military presence, but continued provision and monitoring of political and humanitarian international assistance in building sustainable and efficient national institutions and a system of rights recognized at all levels of society by an informed public.

If NATO’s strategies and operations are based on the needs and priorities of the people, with equal consideration and collaboration with Afhan women and men, only then will they be able to withdrawal from a secure and peaceful Afghanistan.

The author wishes to thank Afifa Azim, Executive Director of the Afghan Women’s Network, and Mary Akrami, Director of the Afghan Women Skills Development Center, for their contributions.

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NATO in Afghanistan: Role of Women.

Audrey Roberts

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Agricultural Initiatives Help Rebuild Communities
How Training and Enabling Afghan Farmers Increases Stability

The USAID-sponsored Alternative Livelihoods Program for Northeastern Afghanistan (ALP/N) focuses on increasing alternative crop and income generation opportunities for Afghan farmers to encourage them to reduce or eliminate opium poppy cultivation. The program is being implemented by PADCO, a private sector international consulting firm with more than 40 years of experience providing development services to donor agencies, national and local governments, and private sector clients.

The ALP/N program—one of three USAID-sponsored alternative livelihoods programs in Afghanistan—supports farmers by, for example, constructing or repairing farm-to-market roads, bridges, irrigation, and hydropower infrastructure; providing business development assistance; and creating short-term work opportunities in a cash-for-work program. Recently, ALP/N and fertilizer for anything less than three jeribs would not significantly increase their income. Since ALP/N had a finite amount of seed and fertilizer to distribute, the program adopted a strategy of providing more seed to fewer farmers so that those farmers could realize better incomes that would compete with poppy production. In 2006, more than 9,000 farmers in the provinces of Badakhshan and Takhar received the vegetable seed and fertilizer.

Fewer farmers with larger harvests appears to have had several benefits. Farmers with larger plots selected planting areas that were more accessible to markets, farmers and extension agents from the Department of Agriculture improved their working relationships, and overall the income of more than 30 percent of participating farmers increased.

Based on the success in 2006, the 2007 spring vegetable seed distribution program gave farmers and their farm cooperatives 21,000 seed kits. Almost 110,000 farmers received seed inputs from ALP/N.

In 2006, 20 individuals were selected by village elders to receive ALP/N paravet training program. Paravets are veterinary technicians trained to inoculate, deworm, castrate, and care for sheep, goats, cattle, and poultry. At the conclusion of their training, these paravets started small businesses in their villages. From January through March 2007, paravets provided more than 48,000 vaccinations in northeast Afghanistan, benefiting more than 3,700 farmers from more than 300 villages spread across 15 districts in Badakhshan Province.

“This [training] is very important to Badakhshan Province,” said Mohammed Alim, Badakhshan’s Director of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. “By a very large majority, people in this province make their living raising animals. Paravets offer essential services to reduce disease and improve an animal’s productivity.”

Humidullah, a sheep breeder near Faizabad, has his sheep inoculated and dewormed about once every six months. He has been paying for the service of paravets for more than 10 years. Because of the good results, Humidullah says he is more than willing to pay the $10–$12 to inoculate his flock of 120 sheep.

ALP/N civil engineers are using gabion baskets (wire baskets filled with rocks) to shore up the sides of roads to reduce erosion on canals and farmlands. The weaving of the baskets requires skill but not strength. Afghan women have been encouraged to join the cash-for-work program to fabricate the baskets. However, in accordance with local custom, women generally do not work outside of their homes. Aisha Changizi, ALP/N’s community development team leader visited the ALP/N sites where this technology is being used and got the local governing councils and religious leaders to agree to allow women to work outside their homes in protected areas. Women weave the wire into panels that are transported to areas of high erosion, where they are assembled into baskets and then filled with rocks. Since the program began, more than 10,000 baskets have been installed, many of which have been woven by women participating in the ALP/N cash-for-work program.

According to a survey conducted before last year’s harvest, 70 percent of farmers said that they owned between one and five jeribs of land (approximately one-half to two-and-a-half acres) and that seed

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Supporting Literacy, Education and Civil Society

Education and Training Reaches Students and Teachers Alike

FROM internal conflict, to a damaging war with the Soviet Union, to living under the Taliban’s draconian laws, more than 20 years elapsed during which nearly an entire generation of Afghan students had little or no opportunity to achieve basic literacy.

Under Taliban law, girls were denied the right to education. Boys were recruited by commandos or were taught only to recite the Koran. Ongoing instability further derailed an already failing economy. All of these factors contributed to the near collapse of the country’s education system.

Today, the outlook for Afghan students has vastly improved, thanks to the Afghanistan Primary Education Program (AEEP), managed by Creative Associates International, Inc. and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Afghan girls and boys now have had greater access to basic education.

Creative continues to build education sector and civil society capacities in Afghanistan and is helping build the capacities of the Afghanistan Ministry of Education under the Building Education Support Systems for Teachers program, made possible by USAID. The company is also engaged in the USAID Capacity Building Program in Afghanistan — as a member of the BearingPoint consortium — by helping NGOs deliver vital services and advocate on behalf of citizens. Creative will provide in-depth training and analysis enabling NGOs to build organizational capacities to better serve civil society over the long term.

Creative is also leading the media component in the USAID-sponsored Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (I-PACS) along with Counterpart International, Inc.

The Creative-led AEEP was launched in 2003 with a mandate to meet the country’s urgent education needs. Under AEEP, Creative worked with the Afghan ministries of Education and Higher Education and five local partners to help improve the quality of education, train teachers and print more than 27 million textbooks in both Pashto and Dari. While three of the project’s major components ended in 2005, its accelerated-learning component was extended to December 2006. It allowed up to 170,000 students the chance to regain years of lost schooling due to war or other hardships. All enrolled students had the opportunity to complete their education through Grade 6.

AEEP’s accelerated learning program focused on over-age learners, especially girls, whose schooling was interrupted or denied because of conflict. The program enabled students to complete two grades in one year. The goal of the accelerated-learning component was to bring learners up to their appropriate grade level so that they might rejoin government schools.

Using a method of partnering with local experts to ensure sustainability after the program’s end, AEEP’s accelerated learning program was able to reach the most remote mountain villages of Afghanistan as well as the female population, as girls made up 56 percent of its student population. Working with its five Afghan partners, Creative appealed to village elders to allow their girls to attend school. Though the notion of educating girls initially met with resistance, the fact that Creative’s partners were Afghans themselves helped bring about widespread acceptance of the importance of girls’ education among parents and shuras.

Despite security threats and impassable roads, nearly 3,600 communities across 17 Afghan provinces were provided with accelerated learning classes. More than 6,800 teachers, 31 percent of whom are women, were trained to lead these classes. A team of 680 trainers prepared them, having been instructed by AEEP master trainers.

Educating teachers in the accelerated learning method, when many of them had not been trained since the 1970s and others had barely completed elementary school was a further challenge. AEEP created and conducted a specialized training program to enable teachers to develop the skills necessary to apply the accelerated learning method.

AEEP further supplemented teacher-training instruction using the nationwide radio-based teacher-training program, which USAID initiated in 2003. The program, produced in both Dari and Pashto, proved an economical and effective way of reaching large numbers of teachers. As more teachers tuned in, it was expanded through the creation of the “It’s Great to Learn” program which wove social messages into the weekly broadcasts and was also widely listened to by the general public.

The impact of AEEP’s efforts abound. For an 18-year-old young man named Muzamil, the lack of a village school kept him from gaining basic literacy; he was recruited by a local commander to fight skirmishes. But thanks to AEEP, Muzamil has traded his gun for a pen and notebook. Muzamil said at the time: “It is not time for fighting it is time to study and build the country and help the people of Afghanistan.” He thanked AEEP for bringing education to his village.

PHOTO: CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC.

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The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 effectively put all contractors under the TVPA by extending the jurisdiction of the law extraterritorially with application to all individuals ‘employed by or accompanying the Federal Government outside the United States’. Under Sec. 103 ‘whoever, while accompanying the Federal Government outside the United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would constitute a [trafficking in persons] offense’ will be prosecuted accordingly for the offense under the TVPA.

Further efforts on the part of the U.S. government to fight modern day slavery was carried out by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. A trafficking–in-persons clause was proposed in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR). The finalized FAR clause is expected to enter into force in July, 2007.

FAR interim rules require contracting companies to develop policies combatting trafficking in persons. Companies must prohibit activities that involve or aid trafficking in persons by their employees. The interim FAR rule suggests imposition of remedies, including termination of contracts if companies support, promote or fail to monitor conduct of employees with regard to severe forms of trafficking in persons, procurement of commercial sex acts or use of forced labor. In addition, contractors need to publish a statement on the zero-tolerance policy towards trafficking in persons and inform employees of the sanctions that will follow as a result of involvement in trafficking crimes. Companies also need to establish clear procedures for reporting such crimes.

In addition, companies need to develop awareness programs on the importance of the issue. They must familiarize their employees with the U.S. laws and host-country laws prohibiting trafficking in persons, and all other related regulations. To aid FAR compliance, the International Peace Operations Association is designing a training program to address all these policy elements. ‘Combating Trafficking in Persons: FAR Compliance Training for Government Contractors’ will bring together experts from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Protection Project at Johns Hopkins University and from the industry, in order to provide IPOA companies with the exact steps, tools and program materials to develop policies to combat trafficking-in-persons.

The keynote speaker at the event will be Col. Jacob Hansen from Department of Defense, former Commander of the Defense Contracting Management Agency in Iraq. IPOA welcomes interested individuals to attend our training program on 17 July, 2007, that will bring us one step closer to successful efforts in the battle against trafficking in persons.

The author is the IPOA Director of Development.

Scott has consistently cited the 1893 Act, which was originally designed to prevent businesses from hiring outside security to disrupt labor groups and strikers.

The GAO’s dismissal of the private security companies’ protests has now, technically, freed the Army to award the RSSS contract at any time. A temporary restraining order filed by one of the companies has been granted by a judge, preventing the Army from awarding the valuable contract for up to six months.

The awarding of the largest Department of Defense (DoD) security contract in Iraq, the Reconstruction Security Support Services (RSSS) contract, has been delayed as legal challenges have prevented the Army from selecting a winning bid.

Originally due to be awarded in June of 2007, the RSSS contract, worth an estimated $475 million, calls for a private company to provide intelligence services to the U.S. Army and security services for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers working on reconstruction in Iraq.

Two different legal challenges dating to early April of this year, have prevented the awarding of the contract. One challenge, made to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), came from private companies protesting that they were unfairly eliminated by the Army from being considered as finalists for the contract. It was their contention that the Army was unclear about the qualifications they were seeking from bidders, as well as what qualifications were used in dismissing proposals.

These protests, however, recently have been dismissed by the GAO due to of the decision by a federal judge to accept a separate protest filed by Brian X. Scott, challenging that the awarding of security contracts to private companies violates the 1893 Anti-Pinkerton Act. The GAO decided to drop the protests made by the private companies because Scott’s protest may force the Army to revise the RSSS contract. This is the first time that a federal judge has agreed to hear Mr. Scott’s protests, despite his repeated attempts in the past to challenge the legality of the industry. Mr.

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Iraq Contract

RSSS Contract Held Up by Courts

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Iraq Contract

Hit Roadblock

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The United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries has recommended that Fiji’s interim administration take steps toward developing legislation to regulate the activities of contractors recruited in-country, and sent to places such as Kuwait and Iraq. Allegations have intimated that hundreds of Fijians have been lured into going to work for private security companies, and later have found that the contracts they signed were fraudulent. These led to irregularities such as poor working conditions, excessive working hours, partial or non-payment of salaries and ill-treatment.

The lack of national laws addressing the work of these third country nationals (TCNs) has raised concerns by the UN Working Group, NGOs and the population. Head of the UN Working Group, Jose Gomez del Prado, has also recommended that the Fijian government should establish regulatory licensing that monitors and controls the activities of companies “in order to provide oversight”. It has also been recommended that measures addressing reintegration issues and post-traumatic stress disorder in the contractors should be adopted. Shaista Shameem, the Director of Fiji’s Human Rights Commission and a member of the UN Working Group, has told IPOA that “we are supportive of this as it leads to safety of Fijians working in PMCs”. However, Dr. Shameem agrees that the whole definition of mercenaries is flawed, and ultimately the UN is concerned with the safety of these workers, not only because of the threat of conflict, but also because of their employment contract conditions. Still, she says that current legislation may provide protection for these workers; however, this legislation has not yet been utilized. This could also be said about legislation in the United States, where the legal means to deal with contractors are available, but has seldom been used.

The importance of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries is its presentation of a report and its recommendations to the Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly later this year. From a legal perspective, the U.N.’s reception of this report could result in the first steps toward international regulation for private security contractors.
Why the Peace and Stability Operations Industry Should Harness the Power of CI

INTelligence can be defined as “information about an enemy or a potential enemy and the evaluated conclusions drawn from such information.” But intelligence can only really be defined in its organizational context. If the purpose of a business is to create and keep customers, we can automatically understand the usage and need of competitive intelligence as an instrument available to businessmen and women in any business environment, including the peace and stability industry.

Competitive Intelligence (CI) is a systematic and ethical practice that utilizes open source data, available to anyone who may collect, analyze and manage all information that will affect future plans, decisions and operations of any given company. Ultimately, competitive intelligence is any combination of data, information, and knowledge concerning the business environment that will confer a significant competitive advantage or enable sound decisions to be made. Access to this information is vital for the companies so they can effectively foresee and manage risks, seek opportunities and new markets, take action before competitors, innovate, and exploit competitors’ weaknesses, while improving planning and decision-making.

In the 1970s both the U.K. and U.S. began an important outsourcing process, that included their own intelligence activities. In the 1980s, finance and telecommunication companies pioneered business intelligence to support financial and market analysis of the large volumes of data they had begun to accumulate electronically. The need for CI capabilities grew in the 1980s and 1990s in other industries, as companies began electronically capturing data across the full range of their business activities. This need was further compounded by the growing interest in real time data access, which required effective tools to mine and analyze, dramatically increased data volumes.

As soon as the demand for these services was made clear, companies fully dedicated to providing business intelligence services were also created. They provide clients with the most up-to-date information about world events which in turn can be used to assess business options. Within services offered by such companies, one can find everything from analytical reports and briefings that can be delivered daily, to simulations aimed at increasing developing planning and decision-making skills.

Security consultancy, market analysis and ongoing monitoring can be additions to the service portfolio. Competitive intelligence and other business information professionals search in multiple sources in order to validate data, in a combination of web searches with online databases. Databases seem to be the at heart of both public (i.e. state) and private intelligence. Evidence to that is the incredible development of software applications that can store staggering amounts of information.

There are certain basic premises that must guide the production of intelligence. There are certain basic premises that must guide the production of intelligence. There are certain basic premises that must guide the production of intelligence. There are certain basic premises that must guide the production of intelligence.

1. Security: the information must be protected and limited to the people who are cleared to access it.
2. Clarity: the information must be expressed in a way that it can be immediately understood.
3. Amplitude: it must be as ample as possible but also objective.
4. Impartial: it must be exempt from preconceived ideas and subjectivism; as far as possible.
5. Objectivity: the information must be produced to serve defined objectives.
6. Opportunity: it should be produced within deadlines that assure its full and adequate use.
7. Utility: information should not be produced just for the sake of having information, it must be useful and later translated into action.
8. Exclusiveness: the idea of exclusive intelligence differs from the journalistic sense. When it comes to producing intelligence, what matters is the different perspectives a subject should be looked at, making the outcome of this perspective unique and exclusive.

The main objective of intelligence is to fill gaps in user knowledge base; to improve conditions of the decision-making process. Given the massive amount of information available through a variety of sources, outsourcing intelligence activities in a way that one is able to order what he or she needs to know, is a very appealing idea. This becomes more appealing if private intelligence agencies are able to offer quality services at a fair price. This cost-effectiveness applies to both the public and private sector and only reinforces the argument that private-public partnerships can operate effectively.

As noted previously, intelligence can only be defined in its organizational context. Intelligence can only be produced, understood and used if put into the right context; it is important that this “context” must be defined beforehand. More than just a product, intelligence and information is a service and it’s available for purchase.

The peace and stability industry is no stranger to this phenomenon. The industry understands the effectiveness of private-public partnerships and understands that it is able to offer valuable services to state and non-state entities. In addition to, the industry must better incorporate the concept of intelligence in its business activities, in order to succeed in this increasingly competitive field.
Iraq Heats Up as Summer Approaches

Despite the Temperature and Violence, Reconstruction Goes On

ALTHOUGH not yet officially summer, the temperatures here have already reached the summertime extremes. We expect to see daytime highs to increase through the end of July, up to 120°F.

Despite the summer heat, the tough reconstruction work continues. The temperature of the conflict is also hot. Last week we witnessed the second bombing of the Samarra mosque, prompting the authorities to announce a four day curfew for both Samarra and Baghdad. Multi-National Force Iraq has announced that all forces associated with the surge have arrived in Iraq. As I write this, Coalition forces are engaged in a campaign in Diyala Province, identified in the media as Operation Arrowhead Ripper.

I am often asked “What visibility do authorities have on the movements of private security companies and other civilian contractors throughout Iraq?” First, it should be understood that there are many different types of contractors operating in Iraq. A recent census determined that there were approximately 100,000 contractors working in Iraq. This is an interesting number and is disputed as both too low or too high. Some commentators claim that this number represents evidence of a massive parallel army of combatants operating in Iraq, a “Shadow army” which is usurping the traditional roles and missions of the U.S. and other coalition nations’ armed forces.

Let’s look at what that number represents. Included within any discussion of contractors must be the folks who prepare the food and, maintain the physical infrastructure for the various camps. There are cleaners, cooks and bakers and Information Technology personnel. There are doctors, lawyers, electricians, urban planners, writers, logisticians, truck drivers, carpenters and plumbers. There are engineers of every type and there are security professionals as well. They come from around the world; from Australia, America, Canada, Eastern European nations, France, Germany India, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, the United Kingdom and many more. One might reasonably speculate that there are representatives of more countries in Iraq today than at anytime prior in Iraq’s history. Somehow though, this number of 100,000 contractors in all types of roles and missions is short-handed to 100,000 men with guns. This is just not the case.

While examining the total number of contractors in Iraq is a challenge, estimating the number of any segment of that total, whether IT professionals, food handling specialists or private security contractors is no less difficult. This is because increasingly fewer and fewer of the contractors here are employed by the United States government. Many civilians are employed under sub-contracts on U.S. government contracts, or subs to subs or sub-sub-subs. Also, there are contractors who support any one of the approximately 50 diplomatic missions accredited to the Government of Iraq. Private Security Companies support international organizations, private volunteer organizations and non-governmental organizations which are here. Security contractors also support virtually every international media entity in Iraq. Private Security Companies support the government of Iraq, donor nations and reconstruction companies. They contribute to the security efforts at the Baghdad International Airport and other airports, various Ministries such as Defense, Transportation, Oil, Interior, and others.

Private security companies help secure the efforts of engineers for the cellular networks and for elections. There are many other examples, but what each example has in common is that there is no direct visibility, legal or contractual link between the U.S. government and the private security company, thus making a precise count of the total personnel extremely difficult. Although the U.S. government should be able to say with some degree of certainty how many employees it has working for it, saying with any certainty how many are working for other entities with out direct relation to the U.S government is more problematic.

The Private Security Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI) is similarly challenged in estimating the number of private security company personnel operating in Iraq. Not all private security companies belong to the PSCAI. And, not all security companies, foreign or domestic, are known either to the Government of Iraq Ministry of Interior, to the U.S. government, or to the PSCAI. Also, there are some companies, both foreign and domestic, which operate exclusively in the Kurdish region in the north and are thus not registered in the same fashion.

The private security industry is emerging as one of the largest single employers of Iraqis. Every Iraqi who is gainfully employed is one less that may decide to pick up arms against the legitimate authority.

Based upon close observation over the last three plus years, the PSCAI estimates the following:

- Approximately 60 foreign Private Security Companies in Iraq (southern areas)
- Approximately 30 domestic Private Security Companies (southern areas)
- Approximately 60 Private Security Companies (in the northern area), many of which are also operating in the southern areas

Precise numbers are not possible, as contracts come and go. By category, the PSCAI estimates the following personnel in Private Security Companies to be in Iraq:

- Westerners: Approximately 3,000 to 5,000
- Third Country Nationals: Approximately 5,000 to 10,000
- Local Nationals (Arabs and Kurds): Approximately 10,000 to 15,000

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Ramos-Horta’s Victory Brings Renewed Hope
After a Period of State Failure and Unrest, Optimism Abounds in Timor-Leste

THE recent presidential election victory by independent candidate Jose Ramos-Horta brings with it an enormous injection of hope into the so far troubled state-building effort in the fledgling nation of Timor-Leste. After a period of renewed violence in the country and political disgrace among the ruling FRETILIN party, the accession of Mr. Ramos-Horta, from the position of Prime Minister to President will surely set Timor-Leste on a more stable path to normality.

The election of an independent candidate — with 70 percent of the vote, no less — to the position of President is no mean feat for a country dominated by one party, FRETILIN, which also happened to be the primary independence movement in Timor when the state was under Indonesian rule. Throughout the independence struggle and then following Timor’s independence, FRETILIN had assumed an incredibly powerful role in the nation’s political landscape. In the country’s first post-independence elections, FRETILIN gained 55 of the parliament’s 88 seats, and its leader, Xanana Gusmão, was elected the country’s President. Fortunately for Timor-Leste, FRETILIN fell just a handful of seats short of a two-thirds majority of parliament that would have allowed it to dictate the drafting of the young nation’s new constitution.

The nation’s first post-independence parliamentary cycle was headlined by the corruption and incompetence of the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, which was further reinforced by Mr. Gusmão’s hands-off presidential style. Among his many shortcomings, Mr. Alkatiri was alleged to have ordered the murder of his political opponents, and subsequently dismissed over one-third of the country’s tiny defense force that deserted its barracks protesting against alleged discrimination by the country’s political and military élites. The ensuing stand-off between Mr. Alkatiri and Mr. Gusmão brought the nation to the brink of civil war, and let loose a wave of violence that required the redeployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. Mr. Alkatiri also demonstrated dangerous dictatorial tendencies by proposing, for example, a new libel law that would increase the punishment for journalists on a sliding scale of how important the libeled official was; the law would also have called for the arrest and imprisonment of journalists merely on a charge of libel.

After its first term of government, there is precious little for FRETILIN to be proud. Besides plunging the country back into violence, the nation’s leadership has hamstrung the country’s development by its inept policies. Perhaps one of the most indicative examples of its rule was the decision to establish Portuguese as the nation’s official legal language, despite the fact that, according to a UN Development Program study, only five percent of the population is proficient in Portuguese, let alone legal Portuguese. This elitist policy has led to gross government inefficiency and to the ridiculous situation whereby the Timorese judiciary had to be replaced by international judges because none of the local judges could interpret their own country’s laws.

It is a telling indictment of FRETILIN that the both the current and former Presidents are deserters of the Party, and are wildly popular. Though Mr. Ramos-Horta exited FRETILIN two decades ago and Mr. Gusmão more recently, their integrity and considerable reputation as international statesmen is quite a contrast to the decaying and discredited independence party they left behind. Indeed, Mr. Gusmão will be leading the new CNRT party into the next parliamentary elections, and is considered a strong possibility to become Prime Minister.

Timor-Leste’s new leadership has its work cut out. The nation currently faces rising poverty above 42 percent, sky-rocketing unemployment above 50 percent, and negative GDP growth among non-oil sectors of the economy. The country was also recently ranked number 20 in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, worse-off than conflict-ravaged Sri Lanka and the unstable Solomon Islands.

But there remains hope. Despite the troubles during his presidency, Mr. Gusmão demonstrated his unifying influence in Timor, and even if a possible Gusmão-led CNRT government fails to turn the country’s fortunes around immediately, at least it will probably not be mired in corruption like its predecessor. Further, apart from Mr. Ramos-Horta, there are probably no Timorese leaders who could have equaled Gusmão’s domestic and international stature, let alone integrity and credibility in the role of president. After five years of incompetence and corruption, that is just what Timor-Leste needs right now – integrity and credibility.
Africa’s New Combat Command is Taking Shape
Benefits and Challenges for the New Continent-Wide Military Focus

AFRICOM, the new U.S. military geographic combat command for Africa approved by the President last February, is beginning to take on its own unique personality. Decisions during the next few months will determine the command’s priority activities. Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, the Executive Director of AFRICOM’s transition team, is apparently casting a wide net for ideas and concepts among interested parties in the U.S. and Africa.

What makes AFRICOM unique will be its emphasis on assisting African nations to build their own barriers to nihilistic political violence and terrorism. Programs will include economic and social development activities, as well as security enhancements. The Pentagon’s term of art is “ungoverned spaces” that are vulnerable to infiltration by determined extremist elements not associated with governments. Because of a lack of resources and political instability in some cases, a number of African countries are susceptible to these threats, both internal and external.

AFRICOM’s first order of business will be to give focus and greater coordination to a number of existing programs designed to enhance the ability of African military establishments to counter the terrorist threat. This is especially vital in vulnerable sub-regions such as the Sahel and the Horn. Secondly, the offshore oil resources in the Gulf of Guinea require the development of an African naval protective capacity that does not currently exist. Recent rebel activity in the Nigerian delta oil producing region have demonstrated that even hydro-carbon production platforms in deep water are no longer immune from insurgent attack. This explains the recent announcement by the U.S. Naval Command Europe that an amphibious ship will be deployed to the Gulf of Guinea in late 2007 to serve as a floating school for the different African naval establishments, such as they are.

In its various programs designed for the training of African military, AFRICOM should consider adding a professional module. With the end of one-party states and the rise of multiparty democracies, African militaries need to take on the ethics of military-civil relations and constitutional legitimacy. Protection of the power elites against political opposition should no longer be a career objective of African military hierarchies. IPOA companies have already performed this type of re-orientation in several African countries, including Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea.

There are also management issues that are crucial to the effectiveness of African armies that AFRICOM may wish to address. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, military salaries are traditionally given to top commanders to be distributed to the units. The money rarely reaches the troops who are required to live off the local populations. They could learn from Senegal or Ghana where the troops have bank accounts and receive electronic payments monthly.

With respect to activities designed to promote economic and social development in Africa, AFRICOM has a refreshingly innovative plan to establish a Deputy Commander slot that will be filled by a State Department officer with Ambassadors rank. That individual will be responsible for linking programs and resources of State and USAID with activities of visiting AFRICOM units promoting “hearts and minds” in U.S.-African relations.

In the context of civic action by combined military-USAID teams, AFRICOM planners should consider how African militaries themselves can be oriented toward economic development support activities. In the absence of external threats in African countries, African military establishments can maintain their readiness while engaging in development programs, especially in rural areas. For example, U.S. military engineering equipment furnished to the Senegalese army under Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was used effectively to improve and maintain rural farm to market roads. Military medical units could be trained and equipped to provide rudimentary public health support and immunizations to rural villages. Reforestation is another area of economic development that could use military organizational and logistical capabilities.

The establishment of a single combat command for all of Africa (except Egypt) clearly has significant advantages in terms of unity of focus and consistency of approach. There is a potential downside, however, that should not be neglected. There is a risk that the military can become the principal face of the United States in Africa due to its abundant resources and extensive travel capabilities for the senior flag rank commanders. The presence of a senior State Department diplomat with ambassadorial rank as one of the deputy commanders will help ameliorate this risk. Nevertheless, it will be important to keep the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa out front as the principal high level U.S. policy representative to African nations. If we want African militaries to be subservient to the civilian political leadership, AFRICOM needs to avoid projecting too high a profile so as to maintain an appropriate balance between American military policy and the entire panoply of U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, social and developmental policies.

Ambassador Herman Cohen (Ret.)

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China: The Rising Giant of UN Peacekeeping

For much of its history, the People’s Republic of China has shunned United Nations peacekeeping, viewing it as a capitalist instrument and remaining mostly a passive member of the UN Security Council. However, since its post-Mao reforms, China has sought to integrate itself into the world community. The UN has become the venue through which China has sought to demonstrate its value as a responsible partner in world peace.

Since its participation in the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 1988, China’s involvement in peacekeeping missions has increased and its contingent of UN peacekeepers has grown steadily. To today, China has sent 6000 engineers, logistics, medical and combat personnel on 15 different UN peacekeeping missions.

Such a commitment of resources is not completely altruistic. Increasingly confident in its expanding economic strength and political influence, China seeks to fulfill its aspirations to be a respected power on the world stage, to raise its international profile, and to boost its global image. With the obsolescence of its Communist ideology, the legitimacy of the Beijing government rests on its ability to maintain China’s booming economic growth rates. According to government sources, China’s economy must maintain its high growth rates simply to satisfy the demand for jobs from its growing workforce. Its economic boom has and will continue to rely heavily on foreign investment and trade. Ever aware of its economic priority, China has been on a diplomatic campaign to foster good relations, curry favor from the international community, and create a favorable climate for its economic development. Its growing support of UN peacekeeping operations is an integral part of this campaign.

Participation in peacekeeping operations often serves as a way to strengthen existing ties with the host country (e.g., Sudan, or Ethiopia) or as a way to establish contact with the host country (e.g. Haiti or Timor-Leste). China is aware that its rise is viewed with suspicion in the U.S. and parts of Asia. Working with UN peacekeeping missions is a sign that China is a responsible power that wants to maintain international stability through peaceful means.

In 1989, China sent nonmilitary experts as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group to Namibia, its first active participation in a UN peacekeeping mission. In 1990, China sent military observers to the UN Ceasefire Supervision Organization, marking its first military contribution to the UN. Currently it has 1,659 personnel deployed overseas on 10 UN peacekeeping missions, in Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Middle East, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Western Sahara. By sending peacekeepers to the Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, China is communicating that it takes these developing regions seriously. That these regions are abundant in oil, minerals, and raw materials is also an added incentive for China to improve its public relations in these areas.

So far, there have been no negative reports against the conduct or performance of Chinese peacekeepers. Eight Chinese personnel have died on UN peacekeeping missions, but this has had no noticeable effect on the political will of China to participate in future UN peacekeeping missions.

The benefits of Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping missions are not one-sided. For the UN and its peacekeeping operations, China’s growing economic resources and political aspiration mean great potential. Due to the absence of an independent standing security force, the UN is at the mercy of its member nations for personnel contributions. It is unfortunate that wealthy Western nations have mostly surrendered their peacekeeping duties to poor developing countries such as Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Jordan, Nigeria and Pakistan. With China’s growth economic resources, the People’s Liberation Army has increased its quality of training and technological capability, and will in all likelihood continue to do so. Most of the main personnel contributors to UN peacekeeping missions such as Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, and Nigeria do not have such growth potential. Meanwhile member states with first-rate militaries are increasingly reluctant to commit personnel to peacekeeping. In contrast, the Chinese Army, with more than 2 million soldiers, ranks as the largest armed force in the world.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan encouraged China to contribute greater numbers to UN missions. China’s political will is definitely evident. China’s prodding was crucial in the Sudanese government’s acceptance of a UN force in the country. In August 2006, a Chinese company won a large order to provide power generators for UN peacekeeping units. This marks the first time a Chinese company has won such a contract from the UN. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has also offered to host A China-ASEAN Peacekeeping Workshop in China.

Chinese participation in peacekeeping missions is still far from a perfect solution to the mixed effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. Although China has been increasing its manpower and resource contribution to the UN, its peacekeeping contingents is still relatively low when compared with other countries. Its military is also comparatively inexperienced at international peacekeeping and is still in the process of transforming itself into a high-tech and highly-trained force. For the immediate future, the UN will have to continue to draw the majority of its peacekeeping personnel from developing nations with second-quality militaries. As China gains greater experience and improves the quality of its military, its contribution to peacekeeping missions should increase. Potentially the most problematic obstacle to prevent greater Chinese participation is the general political uneasiness in some quarters about China’s rise, viewing the greater international presence of Chinese forces as a threat. However, we must remember that no UN mission has ever been used by a member nation to further its domination of the host region and that China’s history of international affairs has been benign and largely neutralist. Any uneasiness about greater Chinese participation in peacekeeping missions, although perhaps natural, is unfounded.

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The Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) is a nonprofit organization comprising fifty members and affiliates who work to prevent and mitigate violent conflict. AfP helps reduce the frequency and severity of violent conflicts through collaborative action. Its members offer multiple skills and perspectives. Some members work directly with heads of state and military or militia leaders. Others are most effective at the grassroots level, cultivating civil society and building democratic institutions. Some members use the arts and mass media to teach tolerance. Others promote social and economic development. AfP builds collaboration among peacebuilding organizations, government agencies, democracy-building institutions, and social and economic development organizations. Collaborative action through AfP helps everyone achieve better results.

AfP also promotes understanding of and support for peacebuilding amongst leaders in government, business, media, philanthropy, religion and other sectors of civil society. The organization advocates for policies and programs that help build a more peaceful world. In addition, AfP provides forums and seminars to increase the effectiveness of the peacebuilding field. AfP gathers and disseminates information and lessons learned to further advance the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives worldwide.

In Guinea-Bissau AfP supports the International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP), which is guided by AfP member The Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation. This violence-prevention project has been remarkably effective in establishing sustainable peacebuilding concepts and practices in the local community and encouraging long-term social and economic development. Due to its success, IPPP serves as a template for future peacebuilding projects and provides lessons learned for a new initiative entitled “Early Warning/Early Response”.

AfP is working with several organizations worldwide to plan, develop and implement a systematic and mechanism that responds to early warnings. Early Warning/Early Response identifies vulnerable or volatile nations and regions, and responds by mobilizing appropriate collaborative action to help resolve conflicts and prevent violence.

In addition, AfP has played a leading role in the launch of the Global Peace Index (GPI). GPI ranks 121 nations of the world based on twenty-four indicators of internal and external peacefulness. The Index was developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit in London, and was reported in newspapers, radio and television in over 100 countries. It focuses on the most peaceful nations and the lessons that can be learned from them. GPI indicates a significant correlation between peace and prosperity, high levels of education, low corruption, stable democracies and regional integration. Analysis of the Index also suggests that countries that sustain a peaceful environment tend to achieve superior social and economic development. The Index will stimulate substantial additional study and help guide program and policy development.

**Alliance for Peacebuilding Facts and Figures**

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Despite Political Obstacles, KFOR Continues to Ensure Peace in Kosovo

O n June 12th, 1999, the UN mandated, NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) sprang into action. Eight years later, KFOR continues its work in the Balkans as NATO’s longest-lasting peace operation. KFOR’s initial mandate was to defuse renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; to establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; to support the international humanitarian effort; and coordinate with and support the international presence. Today, KFOR focuses on building a secure environment in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, can live in peace and, with international aid, democracy and civil society are gradually gaining strength.

KFOR was introduced after NATO-led air strikes during Operation Allied Force (OAF) were implemented on October 15th 1998, for 78 days against the former Yugoslavia. The air strikes were a last resort used after numerous diplomatic options failed to stop ethnic cleansing and forced displacement in Yugoslavia of Kosovar Albanians under the leadership of then President Slobodan Milosevic. Up to that point, the OSCE, UN, NATO and the six-nation Contact Group had tirelessly attempted diplomatic negotiations which culminated in the Rambouillet rounds with the Kosovar Albanians, Serbians and other interested parties. The rounds were a diplomatic means to reduce the ethnic violence, human rights abuses and forced displacement, to restore the rule of law and reinstate democracy. It was estimated that by the end of May 1999, 1.5 million people had been expelled from their homes, 225,000 male Kosovars were missing, and 5000 Kosovars had been executed. However, the Rambouillet rounds were not signed by the Serbs who in fact increased violence in Yugoslavia - to the point that OSCE missions were removed from that nation. After Milosevic ignored warnings of impending air strikes, and continued inciting violence against Kosovar Albanians, OAF was sent into the region.

Following the 78 days of air-strikes, UN Resolution 1244 was signed on June 10th, 1999, and NATO’s KFOR was sent into the area as a stabilization force two days later. This occurred only after a Military-Technical Agreement was signed between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, noting that full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces out of the Kosovo area was confirmed. The KFOR deployment at its height numbered 50,000 troops from 39 different NATO and non-NATO members. NATO assistance alleviated the refugee situation by providing equipment, building refugee camps and feeding centers, providing medical support such as emergency surgery, transporting refugees as well as providing transport for humanitarian aid and supplies to UNHCR amongst others. Today, KFOR focuses on stability, reconstruction and development. Attempting to rebuild a society that is ethnically divided, is fraught with pitfalls and difficult mediations, especially when the persecuted group experienced mass executions, expulsions, rape, burning and looting of villages, starvation and exhaustion. In 2004, severe rioting occurred for three days; KFOR responded by increasing its troop complement to 17,000 which it maintained until 2006. In order to reverse the poor impression it left from the 2004 riots and after losing 46 Slovak troops in a plane crash in 2006, KFOR has since increased its rapid reserve deployment and high intensity operation training exercises.

Moreover, the political situation within the region has been consistently temuous, with instability on the rise in the past three years. In 2006 Serbian, Kosovar and Albanian leaders met for talks overseen by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari on the future status of the province, still technically under Serbian rule. There has been an assumption that UN and NATO missions would be able to transfer responsibilities to local police and administrative structures; however the lack of progress in status negotiations meant that the basic peacekeeping framework had not undergone the necessary alterations.

With the death of Kosovar President Rugova in January 2006, his ally Fatmir Sejdiu stepped into the position, and appointed Agim Ceku – rumoured to have committed war crimes. Ceku insisted that status talks lead to Kosovo’s independence – which was surprisingly received with little resistance. However progress was minimal – and Belgrade refused to yield easily. After Montenegro voted for independence, Serbia wrote a new constitution reasserting sovereignty over Kosovo. This resulted in Kosovo attacks on Serbs, while UN recommendations for Kosovo’s independence incited attacks on UN headquarters in Pristina. As a reaction Martti Ahtisaari recommended to the UN for Serbian enclaves to be reabsorbed by Serbia with Kosovo gaining independence – which has been well received by many groups, especially the UN and NATO.

After eight years, KFOR stands at 16,160 troops, 30 civilians and 3000 vehicles on the ground. In April 2007 the North Atlantic Council visited Kosovo and KFOR; with large support for Mr. Ahtisaari’s status package, the Council remains committed to Kosovo, as well as its continued presence in the region through and beyond the status negotiations.

Contributors of Personnel:
NATO member nations: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
Non-NATO member nations: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.


Kosovo Force (KFOR)
Commander:
Lt.-Gen. Roland Kathre
(Germany) - pictured right
Commenced:
June 1999
Due to expire: Open-ended, based on six-monthly renewal cycle
Personnel:
16,160 troops, 30 civilians

PHOTO: NATO/KFOR

PHOTO: GERMAN ARMY
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