Arab News 01/06/2008
By Michael Shank

The United States’ response to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto has been, unsurprisingly, consistent: this attack by terrorists, while an affront to freedom, must not stop democratic reform in Pakistan, let the elections continue. This mirrors, almost verbatim, post-assassination utterances by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan Ambassador to the US Mahmud Ali Durrani. The unfortunate irony of these statements is that democracy never mattered much to Musharraf, or his American donors. In neglecting to nurture healthy political, social and economic institutions in Pakistan, extremism thrived while democracy deteriorated. In all three of these sectors, the commitment to quality was always in question.

Firstly, healthy political systems were never the goal. Of the $11 billion in US aid to Pakistan since Musharraf’s military coup in 2001, only 1/400ths of that sum, a mere $26 million, was spent on establishing the necessary institutions–election commissions, ballot machines, monitoring systems, legal observers–for democratic elections. Moreover, in recent handpicking of the election commission chair and the judiciary, and in the suspension of the constitution, Musharraf precluded the opportunity for free and fair elections long before Pakistan’s populace ever proceeded to the voting booth. The vote was rigged months before January elections.

Secondly, robust civil society was never the goal. During Musharraf’s eight-year tenure, investments in Pakistan’s educational system were negligible. Annually, roughly 2% of Pakistan’s GDP was spent on education, resulting in some of the developing world’s worst enrollment: only 20% of eligible youth enrolled in secondary school and 4% in tertiary institutions. Despite the fact that over 51% of the adult population was illiterate, Musharraf made no move to reduce that number. The president’s commitment to the social sector was so weak that in the UN’s Human Development Index, published in 2007 using social indicators from 2005, Pakistan ranked 136th, lower than Burma. And recent action by Musharraf–arrests of educators, human rights activists, and lawyers–attests to his growing disdain for civil society.

Thirdly, economically prosperous Federally Administered Tribal Areas were never the goal. Not once did Musharraf commit dollars to improving the impoverished lives of those living in the mountainous regions bordering Afghanistan. Left vulnerable to Taliban and Al-Qaeda recruitment, the Pakistan president was apparently disinclined to provide the frontier tribes with an alternative option, an incentive to say no to extremism: A job, an education and political opportunity. Instead, growing extremism in the border regions benefited Musharraf for it ensured the continuation of US military aid. Despite all this, the US remained unwavering in its support because Musharraf, it was thought, was a critical ally in America’s war on terror. As a result, Musharraf’s martial lawmaking only received verbal reprimand from the White House and State and Defense Department officials. The US Senate, while coming closest to actually clamping down, quickly softened initial threats. Senators Patrick Leahy and Carl Levin were the first to propose withdrawing military aid, followed by Senators Joe Biden and John Kerry who, in a Foreign Relations subcommittee resolution, proposed suspending aid “not directly related to the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban”. Even though the proposed suspension was a negligible amount, not even this minor suspension appeared possible. So while the moderate majority of Pakistan was imprisoned, barred, banned, and tortured, the US government refused to pull the patron plug on Pakistan’s president.

After Bhutto’s death, what is painfully evident is that which was never fostered or funded under Musharraf: some semblance of democracy. And it is not the people of Pakistan who are not ready for it. The majority is moderate. 75% of Pakistan’s populace wants Musharraf out of power, while only 11% has ever voted with the religious fundamentalists. The US has an opportunity to support this majority. Instead of pursuing past precedent by funding individuals, the US must pursue a policy of financing social, economic and political institutions in Pakistan. This is how one fosters democracy. The State Department’s recent pledge of roughly $500 million in development aid for the tribal areas is a step in this direction, but only if aid is funneled through local organizations not US private sector companies like DynCorp.

It did not work in Iraq and will not work in Pakistan. Democracy will flourish in Pakistan only if the necessary social, economic and political structures are steadfastly in place. Now it is time for Musharraf and his American financiers to listen.

Michael Shank is an analyst with George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in Arlington, VA.